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We present an evidence-based model of pathological worry in which worry arises from an interaction
between involuntary (bottom-up) processes, such as habitual biases in attention and interpretation
favouring threat content, and voluntary (top-down) processes, such as attentional control. At a pre-
conscious level, these processes inﬂuence the competition between mental representations when
some correspond to the intended focus of attention and others to threat distracters. Processing biases
inﬂuence the probability of threat representations initially intruding into awareness as negative
thoughts. Worry in predominantly verbal form then develops, inﬂuenced by conscious processes such as
attempts to resolve the perceived threat and the redirection of attentional control resources to worry
content, as well as the continuing inﬂuence of habitual processing biases. After describing this model, we
present evidence for each component process and for their causal role in pathological worry, together
with implications for new directions in the treatment of pathological worry.
Crown Copyright  2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Worry is a primary cognitive characteristic of anxiety, and has
been described as ‘a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-
laden and relatively uncontrollable’ (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky,
& DePree,1983, p.10). The content of worry typically concerns future
events whose outcomes are uncertain, but contain the possibility of
one or more negative outcomes (Sibrava & Borkovec, 2006). Re-
ported proneness to worry varies continuously across the normal
population, without any sudden discontinuity (Ruscio, Borkovec, &
Ruscio, 2001). However, worry features prominently in emotional
disorders, particularly Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in which
uncontrollable worry about many different topics constitutes the
main diagnostic criterion. In other disorders worry tends to be
focused on more speciﬁc events, such as the anticipation of social
embarrassment in social phobia. For this reason we will focus
particularly on worry in GAD as the clearest form of pathological
worry (i.e. it is general, excessive, uncontrollable and distressing),
while recognizing that similar processes occur in other disorders.
Pathological worry has much in common with what has been
described as rumination, more often studied in the context of
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Both involve repetitive
thinking about negative self-relevant topics, typically in quasi-verbalon, Institute of Psychiatry, De
.R. Hirsch), ammathews@
evier Ltd. Open access under CC BY liand rather abstract form, such as “What if something terrible
happens?” (inworry); or “Why am I such a failure?” (in rumination).
Factor analyses of questionnaires purporting to assess rumination or
worry have not revealed clearly independent underlying factors
(Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000), so the two concepts may
overlap, at least to some degree. However, the content typically
labelled as worry concerns thoughts of possible future threats
impinging on the individual, whereas the term rumination is more
often applied to thoughts of past negative events or negative
personal attributes (Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). In any
event, our primary concern here is to present a theoretical account of
pathological worry, without making claims about the extent to
which it may also apply to rumination.
Although anticipation of probable danger is adaptive, it is
unclear why excessive worry about low probability events persists
when it causes frequent mental distress, with so little apparent
beneﬁt. Borkovec and colleagues have long argued that worry is
negatively reinforced by the avoidance of the greater emotional
reactions associated with processing threats in the form of imagery
(e.g. Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). In a modiﬁed version of the
avoidance model, Newman and Llera (2011) present evidence that,
rather than avoiding imagery, worry is maintained by the percep-
tion that it serves to avoid further increases in distress should
a feared event actually occur. Several research groups (e.g., Davey,
2006; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004; Wells, 1995) have noted that
excessive worriers sometimes endorse certain advantages for
worry (e.g. that worry helps them to solve problems, or allowscense.
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that worry is uncontrollable or may be harmful to health), and have
suggested that these beliefs promote worry. Other researchers have
further suggested that individuals who worry excessively are
intolerant of uncertainty and believe that they must continue to
worry until uncertainty has been resolved (Dugas, Gagnon,
Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998).
Aspects of themodel to be presented here overlap with previous
accounts in which pathological worry (or GAD) is promoted by
maladaptive beliefs (Wells,1995), intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas
et al., 1998) and inability to effectively regulate emotion (Mennin,
Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005). Several of these factors may
combine to promote worry, as suggested in the model offered by
Berenbaum (2011), although evidence that they are causal e rather
than being correlates or consequences of worrye is inconclusive. In
the present model we focus on component processes for which
there is evidence that they have a causal role inworry, and that lead
to implications for treatment.Overview of the model
The building blocks in the proposed model are cognitive char-
acteristics associated with pathological worry: these include biases
in the processing of emotional information; depleted or mis-
directed executive control of attention, and the quasi-verbal form of
worry itself. Note that we are not claiming that any one of these
characteristics is unique to pathological worry, or one speciﬁc
disorder; although we do argue that they combine in particularly
potent form in pathological worry, and most obviously in GAD. The
basic form of the model is ﬁrst brieﬂy outlined below; and sup-
porting evidence for each component is then reviewed in the
following sections, before ﬁnally turning to implications for testing
its validity and for new treatment approaches.Emotional processing biases
High levels of anxiety and worry (e.g. in GAD) are characterized
by selective attention to threatening cues matching emotional
concerns (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005), or internally generated
representations, such as bodily sensations, mental images or
worrisome thoughts (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Krebs,
Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Mathews, 1990). High levels of worry
are also associated with the tendency to interpret emotionally
ambiguous events as threatening (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, &
Mathews, 1991; Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010; Hirsch,
Hayes, & Mathews, 2009; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Thus when
thinking about an uncertain future event, worry-prone individuals
tend to make relatively threatening interpretations and direct their
attention to potential negative outcomes, whereas others are likely
to interpret the same situation in amore benignmanner and be less
likely to attend to negative outcomes.
Evidence is accumulating that these biases have their origins in
both basic biological and environmental inﬂuences. Genetic varia-
tions, such as the low expression allele of the serotonin transporter
gene, are associated with emotional processing biases, which in
turn mediate increased emotional vulnerability to negative life
events (Beevers, Wells, Ellis, & McGeary, 2009). Traumatic experi-
ences in adults or children can also result in negative processing
biases (e.g. Lindstrom et al., 2011). In an experimental study, Fox,
Zougkou, Ridgewell, and Garner (2011) have further shown that
attentional biases are acquired more readily in those with the low
expression allele of the serotonin transporter gene. Genetic
predisposition factors and learning experiences can thus interact in
the acquisition of emotional processing biases.Emotional processing biases are usually regarded as partially
automatic in that they typically operate without awareness or
deliberate intent: indeed, pre-conscious attention to emotional
stimuli may be a better predictor of later physiological stress
reactions than self report anxiety measures (Fox, Cahill, & Zougkou,
2010). However, attention can be consciously directed as well (and
emotional interpretations can be consciously endorsed or rejected;
Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009): in the present paper we
therefore consider both automated and controlled inﬂuences on
worry. The processes responsible for a negative thought ﬁrst
intruding into awareness are assumed to be mainly non-conscious
and unintentional, so they are considered here to be relatively
automatic. However, once a threatening thought has entered
awareness it is subject to both habitual (automatic) and intentional
(controlled) processing e for example, we may try to focus on the
content of a negative thought orwemay try to ignore it and redirect
our attention elsewhere.
Impairment of attentional control
Another cognitive characteristic associated with worry is an
impairment of the central executive function of working memory
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), or ‘attentional control’ (Darke, 1988;
MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993; Rapee, 1993). We use the term
attentional control in this paper to refer to processes underlying the
ability to intentionally ignore distracting information (e.g. external
noises when trying to work), or shift attention from one topic to
another (Miyake et al., 2000). Attentional control is distinguished
from more automated capture of attention (as when we involun-
tarily orient to a sudden noise) by the use of deliberate conscious
processes associated with the action of higher cortical structures,
such as the pre-frontal and parietal cortex. Voluntary allocation of
attention is sometimes referred to as “top-down control” to
distinguish it from “bottom-up” or involuntary capture of attention
by powerful external stimuli independently of our intentions e
indeed, such capture effects can sometimes occur despite our best
efforts to prevent them.
Top-down intentional control of attention has deﬁnite limits, in
that we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to actively attend to more than one thing at
a time, although the ability to control attention and ignore dis-
tracters varies across individuals. In their attentional control theory
of anxiety, Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and Calvo (2007) propose
that worry is responsible for taking up control capacity, thus
reducing the efﬁciency of cognitive task performance, although this
can be compensated (up to a limit) by effort. Consistent with this
view, experimental ﬁndings (Hayes, Hirsch, &Mathews, 2008) have
shown that e compared to thinking about other topics e worry
does indeed deplete the ability to exert attentional control,
particularly in pathological worriers. However, in several experi-
mental studies, anxious individuals have been found to perform
less well on tasks requiring executive control (e.g. Bishop, 2009;
MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993), even when any externally imposed
threat is absent. Furthermore, anxious individuals who report
greater difﬁculties in controlling their attention on a questionnaire
measure are slower to disengage their attention from threat cues
(e.g. Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Lonigan & Vasey, 2009; Peers &
Lawrence, 2009). Anxious individuals with pre-existing limited
control resources may thus be particularly vulnerable to any further
depletion of control due to worry, increasing the difﬁculty they
experience in disengaging from negative thoughts.
In keeping with the combined cognitive biases hypothesis
(Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006), we suppose that emotional
processing biases and impaired attentional control combine to
maintain worry. Initially, emotional processing biases increase the
activation of pre-conscious threat representations, making their
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then develop into worry episodes due to the continuing inﬂuence
of habitual emotional processing biases, together with the capture
of attentional control resources by threatening content. The latter
effect has been revealed in studies in which tasks requiring atten-
tional control capacity for their performance are particularly
susceptible to interference fromworry (Eysenck et al., 2007; Hayes
et al., 2008; Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). Such capture effects may be
compounded by reduced motivation to exert such control due to
maladaptive beliefs about worry (Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004; Wells,
1995; Wells & Carter, 2001).
Control of worry in non-anxious individuals
Before expanding on the processes involved in initiating and
maintaining pathological worry, we ﬁrst brieﬂy illustrate how the
proposed model accounts for the lack of worry in a non-anxious
individual engaged in thinking about a benign topic or current
task (see Fig. 1). Such mental activity requires that information
about the topic or task is held as an active mental representation
even if it is not currently conscious (see box labelled ‘benign or
task-related representation’ in Fig. 1). Suppose that at the same
time an external cue or internal reminder of some potential threat
results in the formation of a competing mental representation (see
box labelled ‘representation of threat’ in Fig. 1). These two repre-
sentations then compete with each other for access to awareness
via mutual inhibition (see ﬁlled arrows in Fig. 1), with the stronger
or more active one tending to inhibit the other. Relatively stronger
activation of the intended representation will thus tend to inhibit
the weaker threat representation.
Each competing representation receives activation from other
sources: deliberate attention activates representations of the
intended task via ‘top-down control’ (or ‘concentration’); while
bottom-up involuntary inﬂuences (established emotional process-
ing biases or well-practiced negative habits of thought) activate
distracting threat representations. In an individual not prone to
anxiety or worry, bottom-up inﬂuences are usually too weak to
activate threat representations strongly (and would be more likely
to favour positive distracters). Consequently, attentional control
resources deployed to keep task-related representations active areVoluntary top down attentional control processes
[Task-related effort, attentional control of intrusive thoughts]
Benign or task-related
representation
Competition via
mutual inhibition
Maintenance of 
benign or task-
related thoughts
External or internal
threat cue Representation 
of threat
Involuntary bottom-up influences
[Pre-existing processing biases and habitual thought patterns]
Fig. 1. Illustration of the model as applied to a non-anxious individual able to ignore
external threat cues or memories and avoid worry.usually sufﬁcient to inhibit competing threat representations and
make it unlikely that they become dominant and intrude into
awareness. Even if negative thoughts do intrude, worry can still be
minimized by increasing controlled attention directed to the
intended content.
Development of worry in vulnerable individuals
Fig. 2 shows the same circumstances described above, but now
for a worry-prone individual. In this case the internal representa-
tion of threat is activated more strongly than before (see larger
unﬁlled ascending arrow in Fig. 2), due to the greater inﬂuence of
involuntary bottom-up inﬂuences e emotional processing biases
and well-practiced habits of thought. Consequently, the intended
representation is more strongly inhibited (larger ﬁlled ascending
arrow), leading to poor maintenance of attention on the intended
task, while the threat representation gains strength until it intrudes
into consciousness. Initially these intrusions may take different
forms, including thoughts, images or impressions. However,
negative intrusions in habitual worriers tend to develop into
streams of related verbal thoughts about related threats (indicated
by the box on the right labelled ‘protracted worry in verbal form’)
which create further problems due to their tendency to persist and
lead to more intrusions in the future.
In summary, negative thoughts initially intrude into
awareness as the result of a combination of stronger unintentional
“bottom-up” inﬂuences that serve to activate representations of
threat; and insufﬁcient voluntary “top-down” control to overcome
the competing threat representations, leading to loss of attention to
the original focus. Bottom-up inﬂuences include acquired pro-
cessing biases and similar well-practiced habits of thought about
emotional concerns. Thus the model proposes a role for past
learning of processing style, so that a tendency to worry can ‘grow’
over time as processing habits become more automated with
repetition and exert increasing inﬂuence over thought content.
Such unintentional ‘bottom-up control’ due to prior practice is
illustrated by everyday cognitive errors; such as the tendency to
erroneously repeat well-practiced acts, as when we absent-
mindedly take an habitual route despite originally intending to go
in a different direction.Voluntary top down attentional control processes
[Task-related effort, attentional control of intrusive thoughts]
Benign or task-related
representation
Top down 
attentional 
control
resources
re-allocated  
to worry
content
Competition via
mutual inhibition
External or internal
threat cue Protracted  worry 
In verbal form
Representation 
of threat
Involuntary bottom-up influences
[Pre-existing processing biases and habitual thought patterns]
Fig. 2. The model as applied to a worry-prone individual unable to ignore an external
threat cue or memory, leading to the development of a worry episode.
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Once a negative intrusion has entered awareness, additional
conscious processes can come into play. Individuals not particularly
prone toworrymay be able to inhibit further intrusions via amodest
increase in deliberate task-related effort (top-down control). In
contrast, intrusions in worry-prone individuals are more likely to
develop into a protracted episode of worry (see ﬁlled box on the
right of Fig. 2), as a consequence of both bottom-up and top-down
processes. Intrusions perceived as problems to be resolved tend to
provoke efforts to deal with them taking verbal form, as if searching
for possible answers to questions in the form of “What if ....?”
Negative intrusions can also act as reminders of prior worry-related
content and amplify habitual emotional processing biases that
operate on current conscious mental content leading to escalating
cycles of thought about multiple potential feared outcomes. The
resulting focus on threatening topics pre-empts top-down control
resources and thus makes it more difﬁcult to interrupt the cycles of
negative thought. Furthermore, motivation to re-focus attentionmay
be undermined by beliefs that worry is uncontrollable and can even
be useful, so that controlled attention will continue to be focused on
worry (see right-most downward arrow in Fig. 2).
As noted above, one reason that some people become locked
into cycles of worry is that habitual interpretation and attentional
biases operate on the content of negative intrusive thoughts
themselves (see right-most upward arrow), just as they do on pre-
conscious representations of threat cues or memories. Hence the
more threatening the thought content, or themore catastrophic the
interpretation, the more likely it is to capture attention, promoting
escalation of negative thoughts into a full-blown and protracted
worry episode. Instead of this process being restrained by inten-
tional top-down control, as in a non-vulnerable individual, atten-
tion to negative thought content takes up the very cognitive
resources that would be needed to re-focus attention elsewhere.
Experimental evidence for the assumptions of the model
Emotional processing biases in worry-prone individuals
Attention: Attentional processing biases are typically revealed
when task performance requires attention to non-threatening task-
related content in the presence of threatening distracters e for
example, when anxious individuals are required to report the colour
of threatening words while ignoring theirmeanings in a Stroop task.
Typically, pathological worry (e.g. in GAD) is associated with longer
latencies to name the colours of threatening compared to healthy
controls (e.g., Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001; Mathews &
MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989).
Attention to threat can be more directly assessed by presenting
pairs of cues, one threatening and one non-threatening, followed
by neutral targets in the prior location of one of them (for reviews
see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergramin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van
Nzendoorn, 2007; Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008).
Faster responding to targets replacing threatening cues, indicating
selective attention toward threat, occurs in individuals with path-
ological worry (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & DeBono, 1999;
MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck,
1992). Unsurprising, sufﬁciently threatening information tends to
capture attention universally, and differences between high and
low worry groups are most apparent with moderate rather than
severe threat cues (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003), indicating that
pathological worriers have a lower threshold for prioritizing
attention to threats that are ignored by others.
Attentional bias in pathological worry may be characterized by
readiness to shift attention towards threat and/or with greaterdelay in shifting their attention away from threat. Research using
the Posner task (e.g. Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend &
Mathews, 2001), in which a single threatening or benign cue is
followed by a target either in the same location as the preceding
cue, or to a different location has suggested that anxiety is char-
acterized mainly by slower disengagement of attention to threat.
However others have reported evidence for selective engagement
(Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006), or
have pointed out that what appears to be slowed disengagement
may be confounded with general slowing due to emotional inter-
ference effects (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). Both faster
engagement and slowed attentional disengagement have been
found in experiments using fearful gaze as a directional cue (Fox,
Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007; Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder,
2003). Work by Derryberry and Reed (2002) and others has
further shown how attentional control interacts with these effects.
For example, highly anxious individuals reporting good attentional
control disengage more rapidly from threat cues than equally
anxious individuals with poor control (Derryberry & Reed, 2002;
Lonigan & Vasey, 2009; Peers & Lawrence, 2009).
To summarize, it appears that worry-prone individuals are more
likely to engage with threat-related information and take longer to
disengage from it, although both effects may be inﬂuenced to some
extent by attentional control. Attentional engagement with nega-
tive thought content is likely to contribute to the onset of worry (see
Hirsch et al., 2011) while delayed disengagement may exacerbate
the difﬁculty of stopping a worry episode once it has begun.
Attentional bias to threat in GAD is ameliorated following
successful treatment of pathological worry (Mathews, Mogg,
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, & White, 1995).
Conversely, engaging in worry can have the effect of inducing
attention to threat: interference effects due to threat were found to
be greater after a worry period that after a control period of mental
arithmetic (Oathes, Squillante, Ray, & Nitschke, 2010). Evidence that
attentional bias causes worry is reviewed in a later section, but the
experiments discussed here are consistent with a parallel converse
effect: that is, worry can amplify bottom-up processes, such as
biased attention to threat (see Fig. 2).
Interpretation: Evidence for an association between anxiety and
interpretation bias has emerged from experiments in which
reading ambiguous words or texts, are followed by tasks that reveal
how they have been interpreted. For example, in lexical decision
tasks (deciding if a letter-string makes up a real word), anxious
individuals were relatively faster than non-anxious controls to
endorse ‘cancer’ (versus ‘plant’) as a word when it followed the
priming word ‘growth’, indicating that the ambiguous prime had
been interpreted in terms of its more threatening meaning
(Richards & French, 1992). Similarly, in the context of an ambiguous
description of a job interview, socially anxious individuals were
relatively faster to identify words matching threatening rather than
benign inferences about the outcome (e.g. ‘fail’ rather than
‘succeed’; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997; 2000).
A more general bias to interpret information as threatening has
been consistently demonstrated in GAD. Mathews, Richards, and
Eysenck (1989) showed that individuals with GAD wrote down
more threat spellings of ambiguously threatening homophones
(words that sound the same but are spelled differently e for
example die/dye). In a related study, ambiguous sentences were
presented to individuals with GAD and non-clinical controls and in
a later recognition test those with GAD endorsed more threatening
interpretations than controls (Eysenck et al., 1991).
As with attentional bias, differential interpretation biases
emerge when the threatening meaning of an ambiguous event is
not completely dominant, but is less apparent to everyone (Calvo &
Castillo, 2001). Consequently, relative to non-worriers, pathological
C.R. Hirsch, A. Mathews / Behaviour Research and Therapy 50 (2012) 636e646640worriers tend to perceive more everyday (ambiguous) events as
being threatening, and will be more likely to attend to such
threatening meanings than to more benign alternatives.
Effects of competition: The tendency for those prone to patho-
logical worry to selectively process threat-related information is
modelled here as a function of competition between alternative
processing options (i.e. task-related representations versus threat
representations). This assumption is based on extensive neuro-
psychological evidence supporting the now widely accepted
‘biased competition’ model of attention (Duncan, 2006) in which
neural representations within a system have been shown to
compete with each other for dominance. For example, the usual
neural response to a visual object is inhibited if it is presented
together with another object that, when presented alone, produces
a stronger response. Furthermore, the outcome of this competitive
process is ‘biased’ by top-down (e.g. current goals), as well as
bottom-up inﬂuences (e.g. salience, arousal; for a review see
Mather & Sutherland, 2011).
Evidence of equivalent competitive effects on emotional biases
includes the ﬁnding that pathological worriers are faster to detect
threatening words in lexical decision tasks than non-anxious
controls, but only when two competing target strings (one being
a word and one not), are presented together. When only one word
(or non-word letter string) was presented, no comparable differ-
ences were found between groups (Macleod & Mathews, 1991;
Mogg, Mathews, Eysenck, & May, 1991). This evidence indicates
that the bias to more readily identify threats is more apparent
under conditions of competing processing options.
Some ﬁndings have suggested that there are circumstances
under which bias can be observed even in the apparent absence of
competition. When participants had to make either an emotional
(good or bad?) or a semantic decision (social or physical?) about
single words, evidence of differential bias was absent when
emotional categorizations were predictable (i.e. when only deci-
sions of one type occurred in a block), but was present when the
decision required was unpredictable (i.e. when decision types are
mixed within presentation blocks; Pury & Mineka, 2001). This
suggests that, under unpredictable conditions, anxious individuals
may selectively prepare to identify possible threats, thus speeding
an emotional decision when one follows.
Similarly, with more sensitive methods based on a model that
draws on both accuracy and speed data, some evidence has sug-
gested that single threat words can be better detected by anxious
participants (White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon, 2010). It seems
likely, therefore, that threat representations are more rapidly or
easily activated in worry-prone individuals, even without overt
processing competition, although such effects seem to be small and
thus difﬁcult to detect. It may be that such effects still depend on
the competition for processing resources that always exists in the
environment (whether external or internally generated), although
admittedly this assumption is difﬁcult to quantify and test. In any
event, for the purposes of the present model, we assume that the
extent of competition between processing options (whether
imposed by the task or self-generated) is a critically important
factor inﬂuencing the strength of emotional processing biases in
pathological worry.
Modifying emotional processing biases decreases worry
The association of emotional processing biases with anxiety and
pathological worry is now well established. However, the assump-
tion that these biases have causal effects on anxiety e and onworry
in particular e has been untested until recently. In the last decade
a number of methods have been developed to experimentally
modify biases of attention (Dandeneau, Baldwin, Baccus,Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007; MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell,
Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) and inter-
pretation (Grey & Mathews, 2000, 2011; Mathews & Mackintosh,
2000; Murphy, Hirsch, Mathews, Smith, & Clark, 2007; Wilson,
MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006). Use of these methods has
shown that cognitive bias modiﬁcation (CBM) has signiﬁcant effects
on later emotional reactions to a stressful experience, even 24 h later
(Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006). Within the
present model, these modiﬁcation or ‘training’ effects are assumed
to operate primarily via bottom-up inﬂuences on acquired habits of
processing threat. Emotional processing habits may be acquired
naturally via incidental learning or can be induced experimentally by
repeated practice in accessing threatening or non-threatening
meanings (for a review, see Hertel & Mathews, 2011).
The role of attention in worry has been investigated by allo-
cating high worriers to either experimental training designed to
reduce attention to worry-related information, or a control condi-
tion not intended to modify attention (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews,
2010; see also Krebs et al., 2010). The training used by Hayes,
Hirsch, Krebs, et al. (2010) and Hayes, Hirsch, and Mathews
(2010) consisted of two consecutive tasks: the ﬁrst involved pairs
of one worry-related and one benign word followed by a to-be-
detected neutral target that was always in the prior location of
the benignword (cf. MacLeod et al., 2002); and the second involved
listening to benign descriptions presented to one ear whilst
ignoring worry-related content presented at the same time to the
other (dichotic listening, cf. Mathews & MacLeod, 1986). Thus both
tasks required attention to benign material while ignoring worry-
related information, with increasing similarity to realistic worry
content over tasks. The control condition used similar material but
with attention being directed equally often to benign or to worry-
related content. Effects were tested in a “worry task” during
which participants were asked to focus on their own breathing and
were interrupted at unpredictable intervals to obtain a report on
current thought contents that were classiﬁed as positive, negative
or neutral. The most important ﬁnding was that those trained to
attend to benign material reported fewer negative thought intru-
sions than did those in the control condition. This ﬁnding held
whether thought content was rated by participants themselves or
an assessor unaware of group allocation.
These results provide direct evidence that reducing attention to
worry-related threats has the effect of decreasing later negative
intrusions, implying that biased attention plays a causal role in
worry. Furthermore, several recent studies using multiple sessions
of the attention training method developed by MacLeod et al.
(2002) have found reduced worry in high worriers (Hazen, Vasey,
& Schmidt, 2009) or reduced symptoms in those with GAD (Amir,
Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009).
Attentional bias modiﬁcation techniques have also been used to
investigate the relative roles of engagement and disengagement
attentional processes in worry. Non-worriers were allocated to
modiﬁcation conditions that were designed to either modify
engagement with threat/non-threat content, or disengagement
from threat/non-threat content (Hirsch et al., 2011). Practice in
engaging with non-threat concepts led to signiﬁcantly fewer
negative thought intrusions in a subsequent ‘worry task’ than did
practice in engaging with threat, but disengagement conditions
(threat vs. non-threat) had no differential impact on intrusions.
This suggests that negative intrusions may be speciﬁcally linked to
biased attentional engagement with threat; although, as discussed
earlier, we suppose that disengagement processes may also be
relevant to stopping worry once it has begun.
Just as attention to threatening content can increase negative
intrusions, interpretation of ambiguous content in a threatening
way can have similar effects. In a related experiment (Hirsch et al.,
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benign interpretations of ambiguous words and event descriptions,
or to a control condition in which interpretations were sometimes
threatening and sometimes neutral. In the benign training condi-
tion, participants ﬁrst resolved homographs (single ambiguous
words with both threatening and non-threatening meanings such
as “growth”; cf. Grey & Mathews, 2000) as cues for solving word
fragments corresponding to the homographs’ benign meaning (e.g.
growth e pl_nt). The second task involved listening to ambiguous
descriptions of worry-related events that were resolved in a benign
manner (cf. Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). Thus both tasks
required the adoption of the non-threatening meanings of ambig-
uous material and rejection of alternatives that were made
increasingly similar to realistic worry content. Those allocated to
the control condition were exposed to the same material, but the
ambiguity was equally often resolved in a threatening or in a non-
threatening manner. The effects of training were again assessed
using the assessment of the number of negative intrusions that
occurred during breathing-focus periods before and after instruc-
ted worry. Compared to the control condition, fewer negative
intrusions were reported by participants who had practiced
exclusively benign resolutions of ambiguity, whether content was
self-rated or by an independent assessor.
A further study with participants diagnosed as having GAD
produced equivalent ﬁndings (Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, et al., 2010).
The benign-trained group again had fewer negative intrusions than
did the control group, and a later test of emotional interpretations
(Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews; 2007) conﬁrmed that they
also made fewer negative interpretations. Mediation analysis
demonstrated that the effect of training on negative intrusions was
mediated by interpretive bias. Together, these experimental ﬁnd-
ings provide strong evidence for our assumption that emotional
processing biases contribute causally to the negative intrusions that
trigger worry.
Impairment of attentional control by worry
A number of ﬁndings suggest that anxious individuals are
impaired in top-down attentional control, even in the absence of
experimenter-imposed threatening events. In a neuro-imaging
study (Bishop, 2009), participants had to respond to a target
letter while ignoring other distracting letters under conditions
when targets were either easy or difﬁcult to ﬁnd. High trait-anxious
individuals were slowed more by the presence of competing dis-
tracters (although group differences were apparent only when
targets were relatively easy to ﬁnd and so took up fewer attentional
resources). This slowing was associated with less activation in
dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortex, suggesting that anxious individ-
uals recruit less effortful attentional control resources to inhibit
competing distracters than non-anxious people, particularly when
task demands are low (see also Fales et al., 2008). These ﬁndings are
consistent with the possibility that poor attentional control is a risk
factor for pathological worry, and if worry itself further impairs
control, the combination will make it especially difﬁcult to termi-
nate worry episodes.
In a direct study of the latter possibility (Hayes et al., 2008)
groups reporting high or low levels of worry were asked to worry, or
think about a positive topic, while performing a random key-press
task. Lapses of attention result in non-random sequences, such as
pressing keys repeatedly in a ﬁxed sequence, so that the degree of
randomness achieved can be used to assess attentional control
capacity assigned to the task. While worrying about their main
worry topic, habitually highworriers responded less randomly in the
key-press task (indicating less attentional control allocated to this
task) thanwhen thinking about their positive topic. Lowworriers didnot differ when thinking about positive or worry topics. However,
high worriers were less random than low worriers even in the
positive condition, perhaps due to trait differences in attentional
control, or alternatively, because highworriers continued toworry to
some extent even in the positive condition. Either way, these results
provide strong support for the hypothesis that worry depletes the
attentional control resources available for other tasks, and that this
effect is greater in those who worry habitually.
Leigh and Hirsch (2011) replicated the above ﬁnding using
a non-spatial random interval generation task and not only
conﬁrmed that worry in its usual verbal form depleted attentional
control resources in high worriers, but also found that thinking
about worry topics in imagery form had less effect e in this latter
condition high worriers did not differ from non-worriers. Addi-
tionally the groups did not differ when performing the random
interval generation task alone. These ﬁndings suggest that any
trait-like impairment of attentional control in pathological worry
(cf. Bishop, 2009) is exacerbated by the capture of attentional
resources by worry itself. Furthermore, it seems that worry in
verbal form is particularly problematic in this respect, unlike
alternatives such as imagery.
As reviewed in the previous section, modifying negative inter-
pretation bias reduces negative intrusive thoughts (Hirsch et al.,
2009). More relevant in the present context, the same study also
revealed that modifying negative interpretation bias reduces the
depletion of attentional control resources by worry. As well as
further supporting the assertion that worry depletes attentional
control, these results also show that the depletion effect can be
reduced by modifying processing bias and so increase ability to
direct thoughts elsewhere.
Involuntary “bottom-up” inﬂuences
Earlier models of emotional processing biases have assumed
that attention to threat is promoted directly by anxiety or by
hypothetical “threat evaluation systems” (e.g. Mathews &
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Such models do not
offer any explanation for how biases are acquired, or how they can
bemodiﬁed in cognitive bias modiﬁcation experiments (cf. Hertel &
Mathews, 2011). In the present model of pathological worry,
learning effects over time contribute to ‘bottom-up’ control, by
promoting the unintentional re-enactment of the same type of
processing that has been practiced previously, including the pro-
cessing of worry-related content.
Evidence for such unintended re-enactment effects comes from
experiments in which participants practice responding to some
cues (for example, names of living things), but withholding
responses to others (e.g. non-living things). If response instructions
are later reversed, responses are slowed to the previous “no-go”
word cues in comparison to baseline, revealing that memories of
previously practiced responses (or of withholding responses) were
unintentionally retrieved and interfered with current goals
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). In the same way, reminders of threats
that have been repeatedly processed in particular ways in the past
will tend to evoke repetition of the same type of processing, even
without the deliberate intention to do so. Thus ambiguous threats
that have been repeatedly interpreted previously in particular ways
become more likely to be interpreted in that same way when
encountered later, via bottom-up inﬂuences (e.g. Tran, Hertel, &
Joormann, 2011).
The role of verbal processing in worry
An important characteristic feature of worry is that it is
predominantly verbal and relatively non-speciﬁc or general in
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contrast to the mental images common in relaxed thought
(Borkovec & Inz,1990; ; Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001). Borkovec et al.
(2004) have suggested that worry reﬂects avoidance of images of
negative outcomes, due to their greater emotional impact
(although see Newman & Llera, 2011), and attempting to think
about possible threats as problems to be resolved. Worry involves
rather indeﬁnite potential future dangers so that such attempts
usually fail, because no satisfactory resolution exists. In experi-
mental studies, unresolved problems are particularly likely to be
remembered (the Zeigarnik effect; Zeigarnik, 1938). By analogy the
unresolved threat content of worry is particularly likely to re-
intrude into awareness later on.
In non-anxious groups, experiments on viewing aversive ﬁlms
have shown that instructions to worry afterwards lead to a greater
frequency of subsequent intrusive thoughts related to the ﬁlm than
imagery instructions (Butler, Wells, & Dewick, 1995). As noted
earlier, Leigh and Hirsch (2011) demonstrated that verbal worry
had more marked deleterious effects on attentional control than
imagery of worry content, but that use of imagery eliminated any
differences between high and low worriers. Similarly, when high
worriers were directly instructed to think about aworry topic in the
form of images, rather than in their usual verbal manner, they re-
ported fewer subsequent negative intrusions when trying to focus
attention elsewhere (Hayes, Perman, Mathews, & Hirsch, 2011;
Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). These ﬁndings converge on the conclusion
that one (presumably unintended) consequence of verbal worry is
to increase subsequent negative intrusions.
The reason for these effects of verbal worry e decreasing the
ability to direct attention elsewhere and increasing later intrusionse
is not entirely clear. Even if the latter effect is related to the
phenomenon described by Zeigarnik (1938), this does not provide an
explanation of the mechanism(s) responsible. Verbal and image
representations differ in several respects: emotional images are
usually concrete representations of speciﬁc outcomes, whereas
verbalworry ismore abstract,with the feared outcome(s) less exactly
speciﬁed (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). Consequently, pathological
worriers may ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult to dismiss negative content
as unlikely or unrealistic because the negative outcomes are typically
vague or unspeciﬁed, leaving them inmemory as unresolved threats.
It might seem that there is a conﬂict between these ﬁndings and
the evidence that images typically provoke more emotion than
does verbal processing of the same events (e.g. Holmes &Mathews,
2010). However, when worry content is represented as an image
the emotional response may be self-limiting due to the fact that
imagery forces a speciﬁc concrete instantiation of previously
incompletely speciﬁed worry content, so that any affective reaction
can either habituate or be opposed by reappraisal of the newly
speciﬁed outcome. Whatever the explanation, in several studies of
high worriers instructed to imagine worry-related content,
compared to worrying in their usual verbal form, the expected
greater emotional response to imagery has failed to materialize
(Behar & Borkovec, 2005; Hayes et al., 2011; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010).
Similarly, Watkins, Baeyens, and Read (2009) found that training
dysphoric individuals to ruminate in an abstract manner (that is, in
similar form to verbal worry) resulted in a more negative mood
than did equivalent practice in concrete thinking (which is more
likely to be accompanied by imagery). Thus, although imagining
a novel emotional event typically results in greater emotional
reactions than does thinking about it verbally, this does not seem
true in the case of worry (or rumination). In conclusion, there is
little or no evidence that verbal worry serves to reduce negative
emotional response, but there is a great deal of evidence that verbal
worry has the undesirable effect of increasing subsequent negative
intrusions.Beliefs and related factors serving to maintain worry
The present model is not incompatible with previous proposals
that strategic process, arising from inappropriate beliefs about the
advantages of worry or its corresponding dangers (Wells, 2006), or
from the use of inappropriate rules for when to stop worrying
(Davey, 2006), can play a part in the maintenance or development
of pathological worry. Indeed, it is possible that some worry
episodes are initiated voluntarily or at least are not resisted by
pathological worriers. However, we assume that such strategic
inﬂuences operate on worry mainly after negative thoughts have
already intruded into awareness as a consequence of non-conscious
underlying processes.
Furthermore, it may be that some reported beliefs about worry
are post-hoc attempts at explaining or understanding the experi-
ence of worry, rather than being causes of worry (see Nisbett &
Wilson, 1977; for a discussion of how post-hoc rationalizations
can arise). None the less, maladaptive beliefs clearly have
the potential to undermine the motivation to oppose worry via
top-down effort. For example, the (negative) belief that worry is
uncontrollable is likely to reduce efforts to prevent it, and the
(positive) belief that worry is helpful could similarly undermine the
motivation to stop worrying. Consequently, we include meta-
cognitive beliefs about worry as one top-down inﬂuence in GAD,
since they may divert more attentional control resources to worry
content and discourage efforts to focus thoughts elsewhere.
Other researchers have developed the hypothesis that worry
depends on individual differences in intolerance for uncertainty, so
that thosewho are particularly intolerant aremotivated to continue
worrying in an attempt to resolve their uncertainty (Dugas et al.,
1998). Support for this hypothesis comes from evidence that high
worriers require more evidence in uncertain categorization tasks
before arriving at a decision (Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1991).
Ladouceur, Gosselin, and Dugas (2000) attempted amore direct test
of the intolerance of uncertainty hypothesis by manipulating
uncertainty in a gambling task and showed that this was associated
with increased worry. Although these ﬁndings can be interpreted
as evidence that intolerance of uncertainty causes both worry and
anticipated distress in ambiguous situations, intolerance of uncer-
tainty can also be seen as a consequence of biased emotional pro-
cessing of threat information. To illustrate this possibility, consider
a personwho thinks that there is an imminent and severe threat to
their future well-being (e.g. death of a loved one, ﬁnancial ruin etc).
Such a person is likely to exhibit intolerance of the uncertain risk
and make repeated efforts to avert it, because the perceived cost of
failure is so high. Evidence presented earlier suggests that
emotional processing biases lead to minor or vague future threats
being treated as if they were severe and costly. That is, selectively
attending to the most threatening possibilities, and interpreting
ambiguity in the most threatening way, is likely to result in a focus
on potentially catastrophic outcomes about which any uncertainty
will be perceived as intolerable.Further implications for the treatment of pathological worry
Evidence already reviewed has shown that modifying emotional
processing biases reduces negative intrusive thoughts in vulnerable
individuals (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs,
et al., 2010; Hirsch et al., 2009). In contrast, a recent meta-analysis
(Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) led to the conclusion that the overall effect
of cognitive bias modiﬁcation across different populations is rela-
tively weak, although it might be useful as an adjunct treatment.
However, the few studies that targeted pathological worry with
multiple sessions of CBM (e.g. Amir et al., 2009) had at least
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forms of CBM have even greater effects.
Existing evidence thus supports our contention that processing
biases (in combination with other factors) contribute to patholog-
ical worry: none the less, our model can only be conﬁrmed by
surviving tests of newly derived predictions. We have argued that
processing biases operate pre-consciously to initiate intrusions, but
continue to inﬂuence conscious content and direct thinking to
increasingly negative possibilities. To determine whether process-
ing biases do indeed act on conscious content as we predict, as well
as on intrusion frequency, experiments are required that investi-
gate more directly whether training biases in a more benign
direction reduces the negativity of worry content.
By contrast, we have assumed that current beliefs about worry
(e.g. that worry is uncontrollable or even helpful) reduce top down
attempts to control worry, but do not change the probability of
negative thoughts intruding into awareness, which depend
primarily on pre-conscious processes. Alternatively, it could be that
beliefs can operate directly on automatic attentional processes, in
the same way as do current goals (Vogt, De Houwer, Moors, van
Damme, & Crombez, 2010). For example, if detecting the presence
of a possible imminent danger is the current goal (rather than
another task), then we would expect that top-down resources
would be directed towards that goal, strengthening representations
of threat cues and promoting attention to them. However, the
maladaptive beliefs that have been proposed to promote patho-
logical worry are concerned with effects attributed to worry per se.
Consequently we assume that controlled direction of attention to
worry content occurs only after a negative thought has intruded
into awareness. Thus, although we predict that re-training biases
should reduce both intrusion frequency and negativity of worry, we
suppose that effects of modifying unhelpful beliefs about worry
should be (at least initially) conﬁned to reducing the duration of
conscious worry episodes.
Note, however, that giving instructions about the contingencies
involved in training can enhance the effectiveness of CBM in reducing
frequency of intrusions, at least in the short term (Krebs et al., 2010).
Such instructions presumably promote learning by recruiting
top-downresources anddirectingattentionappropriately; consistent
with our assumption that attentional control can inﬂuence the
outcome of pre-conscious competition between threatening and
non-threatening representations. Thus, consciously-held goals e
such as trying to maintain a speciﬁc focus during training e can
inﬂuence the probability of later intrusions, although changing
conscious beliefs about worry alone should not have the same effect.
It remainsuncertainwhether explicit learning via instructions results
in more durable learning over time and under conditions of stress or
mental load. Further research is needed to investigate the possibility
that explicit learning depends on the continuing application of
attentional control resources, so that adverse conditions which
reduce these resources could result in relapse. If so, then implicit
learning via practice could provemore durable, because the acquired
processing style should bemore automated and thus less dependent
on top-down attentional control.
The model we have proposed might be taken to suggest that
worry would be reduced by increasing general attentional control
resources. However, this prediction does not follow from the
model, because the direction of any effects will depend on how
such resources are deployed. We have suggested that attentional
control resources in pathological worry may be pre-empted by
worry and re-focused on worry content itself. Increasing control
resources would thus be ineffective if attention continues to be
focused on worry content, rather than on trying to switch to
another topic. In any case, training intended to enhance general
capacity to ignore salient cues is not always successful (Persson &Reuter-Lorenz, 2008). Rather than trying to increase general
control resources, current evidence suggests that it may be more
effective to train the speciﬁc control operations required such as
ignoring threatening cues, in order to achieve the goal of avoiding
capture of attention by worry (Schweizer, Hampshire, & Dalgliesh,
2011).
In some existing treatments for pathological worry or GAD,
clients are instructed to shift attention away from worry and focus
their attention on external (neutral) cues or different sensory
modalities (e.g. Wells, 2006). Similarly, Borkovec and Sharpless
(2006) describe ‘worry free zones’ where the client deliberately
disengages fromworry and focuses attention on the task at hand, as
well as the use of worry timetabling in which clients try to post-
pone worry until a speciﬁed time period. Although these methods
clearly have beneﬁcial consequences, we suppose that these will be
limited by their reliance on enhancing top-down control over
worry. The ease with which processing bias can be modiﬁed has
been found to predict success in the treatment of anxiety (Clarke,
Chen, & Guastella, 2012) suggesting that some treatment failures
may be attributable to lack of changes in these underlying pro-
cessing biases. The combination of top-down and bottom-up
inﬂuences in the present model leads us to the prediction that
pathological worry should be most effectively treated by a combi-
nation of practice-based bias modiﬁcation (to reduce negative
intrusions and negativity of worry), together with interventions
aimed at strengthening deliberate attempts to control and limit
worry episodes.
A ﬁnal therapeutic direction is suggested by the dominance of
verbal linguistic processing and lack of imagery in worry (Borkovec
& Inz, 1990; Hirsch, Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012;
Hoyer et al., 2001). Worriers instructed to generate imagery of
worry topics, rather than worrying as usual, reported fewer nega-
tive intrusions in the following test (Stokes & Hirsch, 2010), adding
to previous evidence that worry in verbal form increases later
intrusions. It remains unclear why this should be the case, although
we have suggested that, unlike the relatively non-speciﬁc content
of worry, concrete images may promote habituation and/or their
rejection as implausible. These possibilities need to be tested in
future experiments, as should the therapeutic effectiveness of
protracted practice in imagining worry outcomes for reducing
intrusions and the negative content of worry.
Conclusions
We have presented a cognitive model of pathological worry,
focusing on the origin of intrusive negative thoughts, and the
transition from intrusions to protracted worry. The central
components of this model include basic processing biases in
attention and interpretation that can operate independently of
awareness or intent and serve to strengthen the representation of
threat-related information, increasing the chance that they will
break though into awareness in the form of intrusive thoughts.
Such intrusions can be opposed to some extent by top-down
attentional control, but once dominant, threatening thoughts in
verbal form tend to pre-empt attentional control resources, making
it more difﬁcult to ignore worry-related thoughts. As well as the
effects of impaired (or misdirected) attentional control, worry
content continues to be inﬂuenced by acquired biases and habits of
thought favouring more threatening possible meanings and
outcomes. Repeated cycles of these processes can lead to worry
being perceived as uncontrollable, as in GAD.
The present model borrows from several other theoretical views
and incorporates the contribution of inappropriate beliefs about
worry (Wells, 2006), intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas et al., 1998),
and the role of verbal processing in worry (Borkovec & Inz, 1990).
C.R. Hirsch, A. Mathews / Behaviour Research and Therapy 50 (2012) 636e646644Despite these similarities, we suggest that prior models have not
recognized the critical role of emotional processing biases, which
not only serve to bring threatening thoughts into awareness, but
continue to operate on the content of worry itself, augmenting and
maintaining the impact of worry. We have presented evidence for
these putative processes, by showing that modifying processing
biases decreases the frequency of intrusive thoughts, and reduces
the depletion of attentional control by worry (Hirsch et al., 2009).
Other clinical researchers have gone further and shown that
multiple sessions of attentional training can have a powerful effect
on symptoms of GAD (e.g. Amir et al., 2009) providing additional
support for the critical role of processing biases. However, the
present model suggests that the combination of these methods
with procedures designed to redirect attentional control and
modify the usual verbal form of worry should be particularly
effective. More generally, we hope that the model proposed here
will further stimulate experimental and therapeutic studies
designed to test and modify the various interacting cognitive
inﬂuences described here.Acknowledgements
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